The negative compatibility effect: A case for
					self-inhibition by Schlaghecken, Friederike et al.
227
http://www.ac-psych.org
The negative compatibility effect: A case for 
self-inhibition 
Friederike Schlaghecken, Laura Rowley, Sukhdev Sembi, Rachel Simmons, 
and Daniel Whitcomb
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Keywords
masked priming, negative compatibility effect, inhibition
2007 • volume 3 • no 1-2 • 227-240
Received 18.10.2006
                      Accepted 09.01.2007
Correspondence  concerning  this  article  should  be  ad-
dressed  to  Friederike  Schlaghecken,  Department  of  Psy-
chology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United 
Kingdom.  Electronic  mail  may  be  sent  via  Internet  to 
F.Schlaghecken@warwick.ac.uk
InTRoDucTIon
For any complex organism, the successful control of 
behaviour  requires  the  ability  to  quickly  detect  po-
tentially relevant changes in the environment, and to 
adjust ongoing motor processes in response to these 
changes. These fast and usually small-scale modifica-
tions  are  generally  assumed  to  be  ‘automatic’  (i.e., 
independent of online intentional or top-down control), 
because they will be elicited a) even by response-irrel-
evant stimuli or stimulus features, and b) even when 
they are detrimental to the current behavioural goals. 
For example, in the Erikson flanker task, behavioural 
and electrophysiological evidence indicates that once 
the required stimulus-response mappings have been 
established, motor activation is not only triggered by 
the response-relevant central target stimulus, but also 
by the response-irrelevant flanking distractor stimuli 
(e.g., Smid, Mulder, & Mulder, 1990). If these flankers 
indicate a different response than the target (e.g., if 
the target requires a left-hand response, but the flank-
ing stimuli are associated with a right-hand response), 
then  a  response  conflict  results,  which  will  increase 
reaction times (RTs) and error rates. 
This might suggest that such automatic response 
activations are generally disadvantageous and should 
be  suppressed  at  all  costs  –  however,  we  need  to 
keep in mind that  the flanker task  and similar ex-
perimental paradigms represent highly artificial situ-
ations in that the response-relevant and -irrelevant 
stimuli  are  always  defined  in  advance  (e.g.,  via 
their spatial location). In a natural environment, in 
contrast, every stimulus is potentially response rel-
evant and thus should be given access to the motor 
system. Obviously, though, even in a natural envi-
ronment not all stimuli do, in fact, require an overt 
response. Consequently, control mechanisms need to 
be in place to ensure that behavioural modifications 
remain  in  line  with  the  overall  behavioural  goals. 
Such  control  mechanisms  have  traditionally  been 
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In  masked  priming,  a  briefly  presented  prime 
stimulus is followed by a mask, which in turn is 
followed by the task-relevant target. under certain 
conditions, negative compatibility effects (ncEs) 
occur, with impaired performance on compatible 
trials (where prime and target indicate the same 
response)  relative  to  incompatible  trials  (where 
they indicate opposite responses). However, the 
exact boundary conditions of ncEs, and hence the 
functional significance of this effect, are still under 
discussion. In particular, it has been argued that 
the NCE might be a stimulus-specific phenomenon 
of little general interest. This paper presents new 
findings indicating that the NCE can be obtained 
under  a  wider  variety  of  conditions,  suggesting 
that it reflects more general processes in motor 
control. In addition, evidence is provided suggest-
ing that prime identification levels in forced choice 
tasks – usually employed to estimate prime visibil-
ity in masked prime tasks – are affected by prior 
experience with the prime (Exp. 1) as well as by 
direct motor priming (Exp. 2 & 3).
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regarded  as  ‘voluntary,’  ‘top-down,’  or  ‘goal-driven’ 
(as opposed to the initial ‘involuntary,’ ‘bottom-up,’ or 
‘stimulus-driven’ motor activation), or in other words, 
as ‘controlled’ as opposed to ‘automatic’ (e.g., Band 
& van Boxtel, 1999). However, these distinctions are 
far less clear-cut than one might expect – after all, 
provided that we do not wish to invoke the notion of 
a ‘homunculus’ in the brain, even the most high-level 
control functions have to be instantiated by automatic 
neural processes (for a recent discussion of these is-
sues, see, e.g., Hommel, 2007).
The masked prime paradigm has been used to di-
rectly investigate such ‘automatic control.’ In a typical 
task, a briefly presented prime stimulus is followed by 
a mask, which in turn is followed by the task-relevant 
target stimulus. On any given trial, the prime might 
be a stimulus associated with the same response as 
the subsequent target (compatible trial), a stimulus 
associated with the opposite response (incompatible 
trial), or a stimulus not associated with any response 
at all (neutral trial). Although the prime might remain 
below the observer’s threshold of conscious percep-
tion  due  to  its  brief  presentation  and  subsequent 
masking, it can nevertheless trigger an activation of 
its corresponding motor response, as evidenced by 
electrophysiological  and  haemodynamic  measures 
(e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Eimer, 1999; Eimer  & 
Schlaghecken,  1998;  Leuthold  &  Kopp,  1998).  If 
motor  activation  in  response  to  the  target  occurs 
while  the  prime-induced  activity  is  still  present, 
then this will result in positive compatibility effects 
(PCEs) with behavioural benefits on compatible and 
costs on incompatible trials relative to neutral trials 
(e.g., Aron et al., 2003; Dehaene et al., 1998; Eimer, 
1999;  Schlaghecken & Eimer, 1997,  2000;  Seiss  & 
Praamstra,  2004).  However,  if  motor  activation  in 
response to the target occurs later, then the reverse 
pattern  is  observed,  that  is,  negative  compatibility 
effects  (NCEs)  with  behavioural  benefits  on  incom-
patible trials and costs on compatible trials relative 
to neutral trials occur (e.g., Aron et al., 2003; Eimer, 
1999; Klapp & Haas, 2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; 
Lingnau  &  Vorberg,  2005;  Schlaghecken  &  Eimer, 
1997, 2000, 2002, 2006).
We  have  argued  that  this  latter  effect  reflects  a 
low-level  and  automatic  process  of  inhibitory  mo-
tor control (Schlaghecken, Bowman, & Eimer, 2006; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002, 2006), which acts as 
an ‘emergency brake’ mechanism to stop early mo-
tor activations that are no longer supported by sen-
sory  evidence  from  affecting  overt  motor  output. 
According to this view, early stages of the motor sys-
tem employ an opponent processing design, whereby 
stimulus-induced activity in a response channel’s ‘on 
node’ results in correspondingly increased activity in 
its inhibitory ‘off node.’ As long as on-node activity 
remains supported by sensory input, off-node activity 
will be counterbalanced and thus will be of no conse-
quence. If, however, on-node activity suddenly loses 
its  supporting  sensory  input,  then  off-node  activity 
might ‘take over’ and rapidly inhibit the initially ac-
tivated  response  (reflected  in  behavioural  costs  on 
compatible  trials).  In  a  two-alternative  choice  RT 
task, this inhibition of one response alternative will 
cause  disinhibition  of  the  opposite  alternative,  re-
sulting in behavioural benefits on incompatible trials 
(Schlaghecken et al., 2006).
This  concept  of  low-level  motor  self-inhibition 
is  theoretically  interesting  insofar  as  it  represents 
an example of a complex inhibitory control process 
that is entirely automatic (i.e., not top-down driven 
by  central  executive  mechanisms  in  the  prefrontal 
lobes,  which  are  traditionally  assumed  to  mediate 
inhibitory  control;  see  Band  &  van  Boxtel,  1999; 
Faw, 2003). However, the exact conditions required 
to obtain NCEs, and hence the functional significance 
of this effect, are still under discussion. For instance, 
Lleras  and  Enns  (2004)  and  Verleger,  Jaśkowski, 
Aydemir,  van  der  Lubbe,  and  Groen  (2004)  have 
argued that the NCE does not reflect low-level and 
automatic self-inhibition, but rather a mask-induced 
activation of the opposite response. Empirically, this 
hypothesis  is  based  on  the  observation  that  in  a 
typical masked prime study, primes and targets are 
directional arrow stimuli presented at fixation, and 
masks  are  constructed  from  potentially  task-rele-
vant elements (e.g., diagonal lines). Lleras and Enns 
and Verleger et al. argue that these conditions (or a 
critical combination of some of them) are necessary 
to obtain NCEs, and that therefore the NCE might 
be a stimulus-specific phenomenon of little general 
importance: If the mask is in some way similar to 
the stimulus indicating the opposite response, and 
therefore triggers this response (i.e., if the NCE sim-
ply reflects automatic response activation followed 
by  another  automatic  response  activation),  then 
there is nothing conceptually new or interesting in 
this effect. If, on the other hand, NCEs can be ob-
tained even when these criteria are not met, then 
this would support the self-inhibition hypothesis. The 
present paper presents three experiments that indi-
cate that the NCE does not depend on arrow stimuli 
and potentially task-relevant masks, suggesting that NCE and self-inhibition
229
http://www.ac-psych.org
it reflects a more general and possibly conceptually 
interesting phenomenon in motor control.
ExpERImEnT 1: non-ARRoW 
pRImES AnD TARgETS
This experiment aimed to confirm that NCEs can be ob-
tained with non-arrow stimuli. In most previous experi-
ments, primes and targets have been arrows or arrow-
like stimuli (e.g., ‘<<’ or ‘<>’), and it has been argued 
that arrows are ‘special’ in MP situations (Jaśkowski & 
Ślósarek, 2007; Verleger et al., 2004; Verleger, Görgen, 
& Jaśkowski, 2005). Although NCEs have also been found 
with non-arrow primes and targets, most of these stimuli 
consisted of intersecting straight lines of different rela-
tive position or orientation (e.g., Eimer, 1999; Verleger 
et  al.,  2005).  Moreover,  the  corresponding  masking 
stimuli also consisted of intersecting straight lines, thus 
potentially  containing  task-relevant  features.  If  these 
features would trigger a response opposite to the primed 
response, then this process – rather than low-level mo-
tor inhibition – could give rise to NCEs (Lleras & Enns, 
2004; Verleger et al., 2004). Although at present the 
evidence suggests that NCEs do in fact reflect self-in-
hibition  of  motor  responses  triggered  by  successfully 
masked  primes  (Klapp,  2005;  Schlaghecken  &  Eimer, 
2006; Sumner, in press), the question remains whether 
NCEs can be obtained with a different type of stimulus.
The present experiment employed circles with a small 
gap on either the left or right side as prime and target 
stimuli (inspired by Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000), to 
which participants had to make a corresponding left- or 
right-hand response. The mask consisted of an array of 
interlinked complete circles. These stimuli differ from 
arrow primes and targets and from their corresponding 
pattern masks in three important respects. First, they 
differ at the feature level, as they are not composed 
of intersecting straight lines.1 Second, unlike directional 
arrows, they are not over-learned indicators of left and 
right responses. Finally, the mask does not contain the 
response-relevant feature (i.e., the ‘gap’). Finding NCEs 
with these stimuli would thus strengthen the argument 
that  NCEs  reflect  a  general  phenomenon  in  motor 
control. In order to obtain an estimate of the masked 
primes’ visibility, and thus to facilitate comparability of 
the present and previous studies, the experiment also 
included a forced choice prime identification task.
method
Participants
Thirty  volunteers  (11  male),  aged  18–38  years   
(M = 23.1), participated in the experiment. All but two 
participants were right-handed, and all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal  vision.  One  participant  was  ex-
cluded from further analysis because of excessive er-
ror rates (more than 15% errors in the masked prime 
task),  and  two  further  participants  were  excluded 
because they were able to consciously perceive even 
17-ms primes (more than 70% correct responses in 
the forced choice prime identification task). This left 
9  participants  in  group  A  (17  ms  prime  duration),   
8 participants in group B (33 ms prime duration), and 
10  participants  in  group  C  (50  ms  prime  duration). 
Eight additional volunteers (three male), aged 19–27 
years (M = 21.4), participated in a control condition 
(group D).
Stimuli and apparatus
Primes  and  targets  were  single  circles  with  a   
diameter of 0.75° of visual angle. Target circles had 
a gap on either the left or the right side (see Figure 
1), indicating a left- or right-hand response, respec-
tively. Prime circles either had a left or right gap or 
were complete. Masks were 15 complete circles of the 
same dimensions, arranged in three rows of five, each 
circle overlapping with its neighbours, resulting in a 
rectangular array of approximately 1.5° x 3° of visual 
angle. All stimuli were presented in black on a white 
background at the centre of the screen.
Procedure
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room, facing 
a computer screen at a viewing distance of 100 cm. 
Their left and right index fingers rested on response 
keys attached to the armrests of the chair. The ex-
periment consisted of a masked prime (MP) reaction 
time part and a forced choice (FC) prime identification 
task. 
The MP part began with a 24-trial practice block, 
followed by 12 blocks of 60 trials each. Each trial be-
gan with the presentation of a prime circle, followed 
immediately  by  the  mask  for  100  ms.  After  mask 
offset, the screen remained blank for 50 ms, then a 
target was presented for 100 ms (see Figure 1). Prime 
duration was 17, 33, or 50 ms in groups A, B, or C, 
respectively, and 50 ms in group D. Primes were either 
compatible with the target (same-side gap), incompat-
ible (opposite-side gap), or neutral (complete circles). 
Inter-trial-interval  (ITI)  was  1,650  ms.  Participants 
were instructed to make a speeded left- or right-hand 
response to a gap on the left or right side of the target 
circle, respectively. Left and right targets, and compat-
ible, incompatible, and neutral trials were randomized 
and appeared with equal probability in each block.230
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The FC part began with a 14-trial practice block, 
followed by one 60-trial block. Primes were presented 
for 17, 33, 50, 67, 83, or 100 ms and immediately 
followed by a 100-ms mask. No target stimuli were 
presented.2 Participants were instructed to respond to 
the primes in the same way they had responded to the 
targets in the MP part of the experiment (i.e., left- and 
right-hand responses to a gap on the left and right, 
respectively – consequently, no neutral primes were 
employed). They were informed that response speed 
was unimportant in this block, and that they should 
simply guess if they felt that they could not make an 
informed choice.
Data analysis
Repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
were computed on correct RTs and error rates for the 
between-subject factor Group (A – 17 ms, B – 33 ms, 
and C – 50 ms prime duration) and the within-subject 
factor  Compatibility  (compatible,  neutral,  incompat-
ible) in the MP task. ANOVAs were computed on the 
percentage  of  correct  responses  in  the  FC  task  for 
between-subject factor Group and the within-subject 
factor Presentation Duration (17, 33, 50, 67, 83, and 
100 ms). Greenhouse-Geisser adjustments to the de-
grees of freedom were performed where appropriate, 
and corrected p-values are reported throughout.
Results 
Prime identification performance (Figure 2) increased 
with  increasing  prime  duration,  F(5,  120)  =  89.14,   
MSE = 86.63, p < .001, ε = .619, and was generally 
lower for group C (50 ms) than for the other two groups, 
F(2, 24) = 5.22, MSE = 602.74, p = .013. Furthermore, 
these  two  effects  interacted,  F(5,  120)  =  6.03,   
MSE = 86.63, p < .001, ε = .619, as the group differ-
ences were pronounced for short prime presentations, 
but virtually absent for durations of 67 ms or more.
Follow-up  analyses,  conducted  with  one-sample 
t-tests, indicated that for groups A and B, prime iden-
tification  was  not  significantly  different  from  chance 
(50%) for 17-ms primes (54.8 and 54.6% correct, re-
spectively, both ts < 1.6, both ps > .15), but was well 
above chance level for all other prime durations, all   
ts > 4.8, all ps < .001. Group C, in contrast, produced 
marginally significant below-chance identification with 
17-ms  primes,  t(9)  =  2.24,  p  =  .052,  near-chance 
identification with 33-ms primes, t(9) < 1.9, p > .10, 
and above-chance identification only with primes pre-
sented for 50 ms or more, all ts > 3.5, all ps < .007. 
Because of this unexpected finding, eight additional 
participants (group D) were tested under identical con-
Figure 1. 
Stimulus- and trial-structure in Experiment 1.
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Figure 2. 
Forced Choice Identification Performance (percent correct) 
in Experiment 1.
RT (ms) Error Rates (%)
Compatible Neutral Incompatible Compatible Neutral Incompatible
Group A (17ms) 346 347 347 5.1 5 6
Group B (33ms) 357 356 361 5.3 4.5 5.2
Group C (50ms) 370 363 360 3.2 2.3 2
Group D (50ms) 353 342 340 2.8 1.6 1.1
Table 1. 
Reaction times (ms) and Error Rates (%) on compatible, neutral, and incompatible trials, separately for each of the four groups 
in Experiment 1.NCE and self-inhibition
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ditions as group C. The finding of chance-level perfor-
mance with 33-ms primes was replicated. Identification 
performance in group D was at chance level for both 
17- and 33-ms primes, both ts < 0.5, both ps > .8, 
and was significantly above chance for all other pres-
entation durations, all ts > 3.2, all ps < .02.
Behavioural results from the MP task are presented 
in Table 1. Reaction times showed neither a main ef-
fect of Compatibility nor a main effect of Group, both 
Fs < 2.3, both ps > .11, but a highly significant in-
teraction  between  these  factors,  F(4,  48)  =  5.13,   
MSE = 25.67, p = .002. Follow-up ANOVAs, conducted 
for  each  group  separately,  confirmed  that  group  C 
produced highly significant NCEs, F(2, 18) = 16.40,   
MSE = 16.52, p < .001, whereas no significant priming 
effects were obtained for group A and B, both Fs < 1.8, 
both ps > .22 (see Figure 3).
Error rates in the MP task showed the same ba-
sic pattern as RTs. Although there was no significant 
main effect or interaction with error rates, all Fs < 2.3,   
all  ps  >  .12,  follow-up  ANOVAs  for  the  separate   
groups  again  revealed  a  significant  NCE  for  group 
C, F(1, 18) = 4.64, MSE = 0.91, p = .024, and no 
priming effects for the other two groups, both Fs < 1. 
As  expected,  the  additional  50-ms  group  D  showed 
the same pattern of priming effects as group C, with 
NCEs that were significant for RTs, F(2, 14) = 12.38,   
MSE = 31.69, p = .003, one-tailed, and approached sig-
nificance for error rates,  F(2, 14) = 2.29, MSE = 2.59, 
p = .085, one-tailed.
Discussion 
The  present  results  demonstrate  that  NCEs  can  be 
obtained with non-arrow primes and targets, and with 
masks that do not contain the response-relevant fea-
ture. However, the presentation conditions necessary 
to elicit NCEs with these stimuli differed from those 
of standard (arrow-based) MP experiments: NCEs oc-
curred only when prime duration was 50 ms, which 
produced clearly above-chance identification perfor- 
mance, whereas with shorter durations (as employed 
in standard MP tasks), no reliable priming effects were 
obtained. In other words, a markedly higher percep-
tual strength was required for circle-primes compared 
with arrow-primes to elicit NCEs.3 Within the inhibi-
tion-threshold model developed by Schlaghecken and 
Eimer (2002), this might be taken as evidence that 
the low-level motor activation triggered by a gap in 
a  circle  is  weaker  than  the  activation  triggered  by 
an arrow: In this case, more sensory input would be 
needed  to  build  up  activation  levels  strong  enough 
to require self-inhibition when the supporting sensory 
evidence is suddenly removed. However, although it 
might be plausible to assume that an over-learned 
arrow prime triggers strong activations more quickly 
than the present stimuli, this hypothesis must remain 
purely speculative, as there is as yet no way to in-
dependently assess the strength of low-level motor 
activation.  Furthermore,  it  might  be  possible  that 
instead of indicating conscious prime perception, the 
identification levels with 50-ms stimuli were due to 
direct motor priming effects (i.e., to the activation of 
the correct motor response by the masked prime). 
This  issue  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  below 
(Experiments 2 and 3). 
Another unexpected finding of Experiment 1 is the 
difference in FC prime identification performance be-
tween the experimental groups. Participants in groups 
A  and  B  (with  17-  and  33-ms  primes,  respectively, 
in the MP task) consistently identified 33-ms primes 
with above-chance accuracy, whereas participants in 
groups C and D (50-ms primes) equally consistently 
performed at chance level with this prime duration.4   
This suggests that prior experience with the stimulus 
material in the MP task influences subsequent prime 
identification  performance  in  the  FC  task.  Although 
such a transfer effect has not been described previously 
in the MP literature, it is consistent with results from a 
recent perceptual learning experiment (Schlaghecken, 
Blagrove, & Maylor, in press). In this experiment, par-
ticipants’ identification performance of 17-ms primes 
improved significantly even within one session when 
the masking stimulus was held constant across trials. 
It thus seems conceivable that in the present experi-
ment, perceptual learning of ‘difficult’ short-duration 
primes occurred during the MP task for groups A and 
B, accounting for their above-chance identification of 
Figure 3. 
Priming effects (incompatible minus compatible) on reaction 
times (black) and error rates (white) in Experiment 1.
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33-ms  primes  (though  not  of  17-ms  primes)  in  the 
subsequent FC task.
Participants in the two 50-ms groups, in contrast, 
did not encounter 33-ms (or shorter) primes in the 
MP task, and thus had no opportunity for perceptual 
learning  of  these  primes.  Consequently,  they  only 
identified  longer-duration  primes  with  more  than 
chance accuracy in the FC task. Again, this reasoning 
has to remain speculative at present. Future studies 
will be needed to investigate such systematic carry-
over effects in detail.
ExpERImEnT 2: IRRELEvAnT 
mASkS AnD non-cEnTRAL  
TARgETS
As noted in the Introduction, it has been argued that 
the NCE does not result from low-level motor inhibition, 
but merely reflects activation of the motor response 
opposite to the prime. More specifically, Verleger et al. 
(2004) argue that direct perceptual interactions be-
tween prime and mask trigger the opposite response, 
whereas  Lleras  and  Enns  (2004)  suggest  that  in  a 
continuous process of perceptual object updating, the 
most recent updates before target onset will be those 
of  the  mask’s  potentially  response-relevant  features 
that are opposite to the prime, thus preparing the sys-
tem to respond best to a stimulus containing these 
features.  Importantly,  a  crucial  requirement  of  both 
these models is that the mask contains potentially re-
sponse-relevant features. Recently, Klapp (2005) and 
Schlaghecken  and  Eimer  (2006)  provided  evidence 
that reliable NCEs can be obtained even when this is 
not the case. However, in their reply to Schlaghecken 
and Eimer (2006), Lleras and Enns (2006) argue that 
these findings still fail to support the notion of low-
level motor self-inhibition, because primes, masks and 
targets were all presented at fixation. Instead, they 
propose  that  in  addition  to  object  updating  (which 
triggers prime-opposite response activations with rel-
evant masks), a process of ‘onset-triggered suppres-
sion’ (similar to Jaśkowski & Przekoracka-Krawczyk’s,   
2005,  ‘mask-triggered  inhibition’)  selectively  inhibits 
the prime-induced response.5 According to the authors, 
there are three key components to the ‘object-updat-
ing-with-onset-triggered-suppression’ model: a) geo-
metrical similarity of prime/target and mask (a mask 
that contains potentially response-relevant features in 
form of the same basic shapes as primes and targets 
triggers an activation of the opposite response via ob-
ject updating), b) temporal similarity of prime/target 
and mask (a mask that is flashed only briefly, like a 
prime or a target, triggers selective inhibition of the 
prime-related  response  via  onset-triggered  suppres-
sion), and finally c) spatial similarity of prime/target 
and mask (both object updating and onset-triggered 
suppression affect priming most strongly when prime, 
mask and target appear at the same spatial location). 
Therefore,  as  long  as  all  stimuli  are  presented  at 
fixation, NCEs might be obtained even with irrelevant 
masks (i.e., via onset-triggered suppression only), al-
though this effect will be smaller than when relevant 
masks are used (in which case effects of onset-trig-
gered suppression and object updating are combined). 
However, when targets appear at a different position, 
no NCEs will be obtained with irrelevant masks, be-
cause temporal similarity alone – without geometrical 
and/or spatial similarity – is insufficient to elicit (suf-
ficiently strong) onset-triggered suppression.
Lleras and Enns (2006) present data that exactly 
follow the predicted pattern: With briefly flashed rel-
evant masks, large NCEs occur when all stimuli appear 
at fixation, and smaller NCEs occur when targets are 
presented at a different position (above or below fixa-
tion). With briefly flashed irrelevant masks, small NCEs 
occur when all stimuli appear at fixation, but PCEs are 
obtained when targets are presented at a different po-
sition (see also Lleras & Enns, 2005). This last finding 
clearly conflicts with predictions derived from the self-
inhibition account of NCEs. According to this model, 
target position should not make a difference to prim-
ing effects (other than trivial differences due to overall 
changes in reaction times) – all that should matter is 
that an initial strong motor response triggered by the 
prime is no longer supported by sensory evidence. 
However, we believe that there is an additional factor 
that might account for Lleras and Enns’ (2006) findings 
without violating the assumptions of the self-inhibition 
model. It should be noted that effective masking is far 
easier to accomplish when the mask contains elements 
similar to the to-be-masked stimulus (relevant mask) 
than when this is not the case (irrelevant mask). Thus 
it seems possible that in Lleras and Enns (2005, 2006), 
similar to the experiments in Lleras and Enns (2004), 
the irrelevant mask did not effectively remove the sen-
sory evidence for the primed response from the motor 
system. If this was the case, then target position might 
make an important difference simply because it affects 
the continued availability of the prime-representation 
to the motor system: When targets are presented cen-
trally (that is, ‘on top’ of the mask), they might act as 
an additional mask, cutting short the sensory evidence 
which supports the primed response and resulting in 
NCEs.  In  contrast,  when  targets  are  presented  non-NCE and self-inhibition
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centrally (away from the mask), residual sensory evi-
dence for the primed response might still be present in 
the system by the time the target-related response is 
activated, resulting in PCEs. 
In  order  to  investigate  this  issue,  we  employed  a 
‘flicker mask’ procedure, which has been found to result 
in  relatively  (though  not  perfectly)  effective  masking 
with irrelevant masks (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2006). 
Masked  primes  were  presented  at  fixation,  and  tar-
gets were presented either centrally or non-centrally. 
According  to  the  self-inhibition  account  of  masked 
priming,  NCEs  of  comparable  size  should  be  found 
with central and non-central targets. According to the 
object-updating-plus-onset-triggered-suppression  ac-
count, in contrast, NCEs should be restricted to central 
targets, while non-central targets should result in PCEs, 
replicating Lleras and Enns’ (2006) results. The central-
target condition of the present experiment is similar to 
the non-diagonal mask condition in Schlaghecken and 
Eimer (2006), except that prime duration was increased 
from 17 ms to 33 ms in order to investigate whether 
this would affect the size of NCEs. The critical question 
was whether priming effects would be similar for central 
and non-central targets.
method
Participants
Twenty  volunteers  (6  male),  aged  19–30  years   
(M = 22.8), participated in the experiment. All but two 
participants were right-handed, and all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Four participants were ex-
cluded from further analysis because of excessive er-
ror rates (more than 10% errors in the masked prime 
task), and two further participants were excluded be-
cause they correctly identified more than 90% of the 
33-ms primes in the FC task. 
Stimuli and apparatus
Primes  and  targets  were  left-  and  right-pointing 
double arrows (‘<<’, ‘>>’), subtending a visual angle 
of approximately 1.0° x 0.5°. Masks were constructed 
from a 13 x 7 matrix, randomly filled with overlap-
ping horizontal and vertical lines of different length, 
resulting in a rectangular array of about 2.5° x 1.5°. 
New  random  masks  were  generated  on  each  trial, 
to  avoid  perceptual  learning  of  the  mask ( Schubö, 
Schlaghecken, & Meinecke, 2001). 
Procedure
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room, facing 
a computer screen at a viewing distance of approxi-
mately  100  cm.  They  were  instructed  to  maintain 
central eye fixation. Response keys were the left and 
right SHIFT-keys of a standard qwerty computer key-
board.
The MP part of the experiment comprised 5 blocks 
of 60 trials each, and the FC part comprised 2 blocks 
of 80 trials. Each part began with a 20-trial practice 
block.  Trial  structure  in  the  MP  part  is  depicted  in 
Figure 4. Each trial consisted of a 33-ms prime, imme-
diately followed by a 50-ms mask, which in turn was 
followed immediately by a second 50-ms mask (‘flicker 
mask’). Fifty ms after offset of the second mask, a 
target was presented for 100 ms. Primes and masks 
were  presented  at  fixation,  targets  were  presented 
at  fixation,  2°  above  fixation,  or  2°  below  fixation.   
ITI  was  1,300  ms.  On  compatible  trials,  prime  and 
target arrows pointed in the same direction. On incom-
patible trials, they pointed in opposite directions. All 
conditions (3 target positions x 2 compatibility levels) 
were equiprobable and randomized within each block. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible with a left or right key press to 
left-pointing and right-pointing target arrows, respec-
tively.
In the FC part, each trial consisted of a left- or right-
pointing  prime  arrow,  presented  randomly  and  with 
equal probability for 17, 33, 50, or 67 ms, immediately 
followed  by  a  flicker  mask.  No  subsequent  targets 
were presented, and ITI was 1,300 ms. Participants 
were instructed to press the key corresponding to the 
prime arrow’s direction, and to make a guess if they 
could not identify the prime clearly.
Data analysis
Repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
were computed on the percentage of correct responses 
Figure 4. 
Stimulus- and trial-structure in Experiment 2.
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in the FC identification task for the factor Duration (17, 
33, 50, 67 ms). ANOVAs were computed on correct 
RTs and error rates for the factors Target Position (On 
Fixation, Off Fixation – collapsed across above- and 
below-fixation presentations) and Compatibility (com-
patible, incompatible) in the MP task. 
Results
Prime identification performance (Figure 5) increased 
with  increasing  prime  duration,  F(3,  39)  =  28.65,   
MSE = 75.25, p < .001, but was significantly above 
chance (50%) for all prime durations, all ts > 3.3, all 
ps < .005.
Reaction  times  in  the  MP  task  were  shorter  for   
On-Fixation  targets  than  for  Off-Fixation  targets,   
F(1, 13) = 4.90, MSE = 78.21, p = .045, and shorter 
on incompatible trials than on compatible trials (NCE), 
F(1, 13) = 6.36, MSE = 186.90, p = .024.
Importantly, these factors did not interact, that is, 
NCEs of about the same magnitude were obtained for 
On-Fixation and Off-Fixation targets (see Table 2 and 
Figure 6). 
 Although Figure 6 indicates that error rates showed 
the same basic pattern as RTs, no significant effects 
were obtained, all Fs < 2.2, all ps > .16.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 confirm the predictions of 
the self-inhibition hypothesis of masked priming: NCEs 
with  irrelevant  masks  were  obtained  not  only  when 
primes, masks, and targets appeared at the same lo-
cation, but also when targets appeared at a different 
location, and these effects were of approximately the 
same size regardless of target position (numerically, 
NCEs with non-central targets were larger than NCEs 
with central targets). The FC results and the priming 
effects with central targets almost exactly replicate the 
results reported by Schlaghecken and Eimer (2006). 
Importantly,  however,  the  priming  effects  with  non-
central targets stand in direct contrast to Lleras and 
Enns’ (2006) results. 
There are two main differences between the present 
experiment and the one reported by Lleras and Enns 
(2006). First, target position was randomized in the 
present experiment, but blocked (either all central or 
all non-central) in Lleras and Enns’ study. Thus in the 
present  experiment,  targets  appeared  at  the  same 
location as masked primes in one third of the trials. 
Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  primes  and  masks 
were spatially similar to targets in principle, that is, 
regardless of the actual target position on any given 
trial. If this argument is correct, then masks in the 
present  experiment  resembled  targets  in  two  (tem-
Figure 5. 
Forced Choice identification performance in Experiment 2.
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Figure 6. 
Reaction times (lines) and error rates (bars) in Experiment 
2, plotted separately for On-Fixation (black) and Off-Fixation 
(white) targets.
RT (ms) Error Rates (%)
95% CI 95% CI
NCE lower upper NCE lower upper
Central Targets -8.2 -17.7 1.2 -0.7 -2.9 1.4
Non-Central Targets -10.2 -17.9 -2.5 -1.9 -3.9 0.2
Table 2. 
Priming effects (NCEs) on Reaction Times (ms) and Error Rates (%) on central and non-central targets in Experiment 1.NCE and self-inhibition
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poral and spatial) characteristics, and therefore were 
able  to  cause  onset-triggered  response  suppression 
according to Lleras’ and Enns’ account. 
The second major difference between the present 
experiment and those conducted by Lleras and Enns 
(2004,  2005,  2006)  is  the  use  of  a  flicker  mask, 
whereas a continuous mask was employed in Lleras 
and Enns’ studies. As a consequence, prime identifica-
tion performance was markedly reduced relative to the 
levels reported in Lleras and Enns (2004) (72% versus 
approximately 90% correct identification). According 
to these authors, it is unimportant whether or not the 
mask reduces prime visibility: NCEs can be obtained 
even with completely unmasked primes, provided an 
intervening  stimulus  (in  this  case,  a  ‘flanker’  rather 
than a ‘mask,’ see Lleras & Enns, 2006) contains re-
sponse-relevant features. They argue that the correla-
tion between mask density, prime visibility, and direc-
tion of priming effects – as reported, for example, by 
Eimer and Schlaghecken (2002) – is due to the fact 
that with masks composed of diagonal lines, a denser 
mask is more likely to contain arrow-like line inter-
sections than a mask with less densely spaced lines. 
Therefore, the denser mask is more likely to facilitate 
reversed priming via object updating, not via self-in-
hibition triggered by the loss of sensory input to an 
existing motor activation, as argued by Schlaghecken 
and Eimer (2002, 2006). In the present experiment, 
however, the mask corresponded to Lleras and Enns’ 
(2004, 2005, 2006) irrelevant mask – that is, it only 
contained  horizontal  and  vertical,  but  no  diagonal 
lines, and thus should have been unable to facilitate 
object updating-induced NCEs, suggesting that there 
is another factor – possibly mask effectiveness – con-
tributing to these effects.
It has to be noted, though, that in the present ex-
periment – as in Experiment 1 – prime identification 
performance indicated that NCEs were obtained with 
primes that were clearly above the threshold of con-
scious perception (68 – 73% correct identifications on 
average). This contrasts with earlier findings showing 
that with identification levels of more than approxi-
mately 66%, NCEs begin to turn into PCEs (Eimer & 
Schlaghecken, 2002), suggesting a close link between 
the  absence  of  conscious  prime  perception  and  the 
presence of NCEs (see also Klapp & Hinkley, 2002). 
However, those experiments differed from the present 
ones in one important aspect, as they used a staircase 
procedure to determine identification levels (i.e., after 
a  correct  response,  prime  identification  on  the  next 
trial  was  made  more  difficult,  after  an  incorrect  re-
sponse, it was made easier). The present experiments, 
in contrast, used a simple forced choice procedure. It 
might  be  argued  that  the  former  promotes  a  more 
careful response mode, whereas the latter promotes 
more spontaneous reactions, which therefore might be 
more susceptible to direct response priming effects.6  
In this case, performance levels in the present experi-
ments  would  systematically  overestimate  the  actual 
level of prime identification and hence the primes’ per-
ceptual strength.
On the basis of the present data, it is not possible 
to decide which of the two factors – target presenta-
tion or mask effectiveness – might be responsible for 
the difference between the present results and those 
reported  by  Lleras  and  Enns  (2006).  However,  the 
self-inhibition  account  and  the  object-updating-plus-
onset-triggered-suppression  account  make  opposite 
predictions about the relative importance of these two 
factors: According to the former, mask effectiveness 
should affect priming effects, whereas target location 
should be largely irrelevant. According to the latter, 
the reverse should be true – priming effects should be 
independent of mask effectiveness, but NCEs should 
disappear when the mask is both geometrically and 
spatially dissimilar to the target. The following experi-
ment was conducted to test these predictions.
ExpERImEnT 3: moRE IRRELEvAnT 
mASkS AnD non-cEnTRAL TARgETS
In  this  experiment,  no  targets  were  presented  at 
fixation, while other aspects of Experiment  2 were 
maintained. In particular, the same masking procedure 
and type of mask were employed as in the previous 
experiment. According to the self-inhibition account, 
NCEs should be obtained under these conditions. The 
updating-plus-onset-triggered-suppression  account, 
in contrast, predicts PCEs. 
A further difference between this experiment and 
the  preceding  one  was  an  alteration  in  the  FC  pro-
cedure: In order to encourage a slower, less sponta-
neous response mode, the mask in the FC task was 
followed after 50 ms by two simultaneously presented 
question marks (presented above and below fixation). 
Participants were instructed not to respond before the 
question marks appeared. It was reasoned that this 
enforced delay would make responses less susceptible 
to direct motor priming. If identification performance 
in the previous experiments had in fact been artificially 
enhanced by motor priming effects, then identification 
levels in the present experiment should be substan-
tially lower. In contrast, if similar identification levels 
were achieved, then this would support the notion that 236
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the NCEs in Experiments 1 and 2 had indeed been ob-
tained with supraliminal primes.
method
Participants
Ten  volunteers  (four  male),  aged  19–41  years   
(M = 24.7), participated in the experiment. All but one 
participant were right-handed, and all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. 
Stimuli and apparatus
These were identical to Experiment 2.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 2, with the 
following exceptions: a) no central targets were pre-
sented; b) block length was reduced to 40 trials each 
(without central targets, it was possible to reduce the 
number of trials by one third relative to Experiment 2); 
and c) in the FC task, the mask was followed after a 
50-ms delay by two question marks (appearing at the 
same positions as the targets in the MP task), which 
remained on the screen until a response was given. 
Participants were instructed to respond only once the 
question marks had appeared.
Data analyses
For the FC data, the same analyses were carried out 
as in Experiment 2. RTs and error rates on compatible 
and incompatible trials in the masked prime task were 
compared using paired t-tests.
Results
As  expected,  prime  identification  performance   
(Figure 7) increased with increasing prime duration, 
F(3, 27) = 10.76, MSE = 162.96, p = .001. Importantly, 
however,  identification  performance  was  signifi-
cantly above chance only for 50- and 67-ms primes,   
t(9) = 2.77, p = .022, and t(9) = 6.71, p < .001, 
respectively, but not for 17- and 33-ms primes, both 
ts  <  1.7,  both  ps  >  .13.  Reaction  times  were  sig-
nificantly  shorter  and  error  rates  significantly  lower 
on  incompatible  trials  relative  to  compatible  trials,   
t(9) = 3.01, p = .015 and t(9) = 2.47, p = .035, re-
spectively (Figure 8).
Discussion
The  present  experiment  aimed  to  recreate  Lleras 
and  Enns’  (2006)  ‘flashed  irrelevant  mask,  off-fixa-
tion target’ condition by masking arrow primes with 
irrelevant masks (containing no diagonal, arrow-like 
lines) and by always presenting targets at a location 
distinct from the location of primes and masks. The 
main  procedural  difference  between  this  and  Lleras 
and Enns’ (2006) experiment was the use of a flicker 
mask, which drastically reduced prime visibility. 
According  to  the  object-updating-plus-onset-trig-
gered-suppression hypothesis, the present experiment 
should have yielded PCEs, replicating Lleras and Enns’ 
(2006) results. Clearly, this was not the case. Instead, 
significant NCEs were obtained, as predicted by the 
self-inhibition account. According to this hypothesis, 
NCEs  should  occur  when  the  initial  (low-level)  mo-
tor activation triggered by the prime is suddenly no 
longer supported by sensory evidence, regardless of 
geometrical, spatial, or temporal similarities between 
primes, masks, and targets. The present experiment 
confirmed this prediction. Of course, this is not to deny 
that such similarities systematically influence priming 
effects  –  they  obviously  do,  as  suggested  by  com-
mon sense and as demonstrated in numerous stud-
ies  (e.g.,  Jaśkowski  &  Przekoracka-Krawczyk,  2005; 
Lleras  &  Enns,  2004,  2005,  2006;  Verleger  et  al., 
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Forced Choice identification performance in Experiment 3.
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Reaction times (line) and error rates (bars) in Experiment 3.NCE and self-inhibition
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2004). However, the present results strongly suggest 
that there is an additional inhibitory process in masked 
priming which is independent of these factors (i.e., low-
level self-inhibition).
A further aim of this experiment was to investigate 
whether the relatively high identification performance 
in the previous two experiments might have been due 
to  direct  motor  priming.  By  preventing  participants 
from  responding  too  quickly,  identification  perform-
ance for short-duration primes was indeed found to be 
dramatically reduced and no longer significantly differ-
ent  from  chance.  In  contrast,  identification  perform-
ance for long-duration primes remained above chance 
level  (though  performance  levels  for  50-ms  primes 
– but not for 67-ms primes – still appeared reduced 
in the present experiment relative to Experiment 2). 
This suggests that performance levels for the longest 
primes  might  reflect  processes  different  from  those 
that determine performance levels for shorter primes. 
These results are in line with the assumption that per-
formance with short-duration primes is at least in part 
determined by direct motor priming, whereas perform-
ance with long-duration primes in Experiments 1 and 2 
actually reflects conscious prime identification.
gEnERAL DIScuSSIon
A current debate in the masked priming literature con-
cerns  the  question  whether  NCEs  –  shorter  RTs  and 
lower error rates on incompatible relative to compatible 
trials – reflect a self-inhibition mechanism in low-level 
motor control, or whether they are ultimately triggered 
by the mask, provided this stimulus is sufficiently simi-
lar to primes and targets with respect to geometrical, 
spatial, and/or temporal features. In previous studies, 
NCEs were obtained when masking stimuli met at least 
two of these three criteria, whereas only PCEs – shorter 
RTs and lower error rates on compatible relative to in-
compatible trials (i.e., ‘normal’ priming effects) – were 
obtained when this was not the case (e.g., Jaśkowski 
& Przekoracka-Krawczyk, 2005; Lleras & Enns, 2004, 
2005, 2006; Verleger et al., 2004). These results have 
been interpreted as disproving the self-inhibition hy-
pothesis and supporting (variants of) the hypothesis 
that the NCE is mask-induced. Furthermore, Verleger 
and  colleagues  (2005)  have  argued  that  arrows  are 
‘special’ and are more suited than other stimuli to trig-
ger NCEs when employed as primes and targets.
In three masked priming experiments, the present 
study demonstrated that NCEs can be obtained with 
stimuli other than arrows (Exp. 1), and with irrelevant 
masks and targets that appear at a different position 
from the masked primes (Exp. 2 & 3). These results 
clearly contradict the predictions of the mask-induced 
NCE hypotheses, but are fully in line with the self-inhi-
bition account of masked priming. 
It should be stressed that this conclusion does not 
deny the existence of mask-induced effects. Obviously, 
such effects not only exist, but can have a dramatic 
impact  on  overt  performance  as  demonstrated,  for 
example,  by  Jaśkowski  and  Przekoracka-Krawczyk 
(2005),  who  obtained  NCEs  with  ‘masking’  stimuli 
that did not reduce prime visibility, but did contain ar-
row-like stimuli (see also Lleras & Enns, 2006). The 
mechanisms underlying such mask-induced reversal of 
primed motor activation are as yet not fully understood, 
and future studies should explore this phenomenon in 
more detail. In the context of the present experiments, 
however, the central argument is that the existence of 
mask-induced NCEs is independent of the existence of 
self-inhibition-induced NCEs: Both might be obtained in 
the same experimental paradigm, but it is also possible 
to obtain the former under conditions that disallow self-
inhibition (e.g., with unmasked primes), and to obtain 
the latter under conditions that exclude the possibility 
of mask-induced NCEs (according to the criteria set out 
by the proponents of these accounts).
Thus in our view, the mask-induced NCE account and 
the self-inhibition NCE account are not mutually exclu-
sive, but simply describe different processes that result 
in  the  same  observable  effect  (the  same  argument 
has  also  been  made  by  Klapp,  2005).  Interestingly, 
though,  it  seems  that  some  proponents  of  mask-in-
duced NCE-accounts disagree with this view, arguing 
that no low-level self-inhibition processes are involved 
at all (e.g., Jaśkowski & Przekoracka-Krawczyk, 2005; 
Lleras & Enns, 2006). This might point to an important 
theoretical difference between these two approaches 
regarding  the  question  whether  inhibitory  control  is 
possible even at low, ‘automatic’ processing levels, or 
whether it always requires higher-level executive com-
mands. Given that opponent processing – the mecha-
nism  assumed  to  mediate  self-inhibition  (Bowman, 
Schlaghecken, & Eimer, 2006; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 
2002) – appears to be a general processing principle 
of the central nervous system from perceptual input to 
motor output (e.g., Hurvich & Jameson, 1974; Levine 
&  Leven,  1991;  Pearson,  1993;  Pribe,  Grossberg,  & 
Cohen, 1997), it seems reasonable to assume that this 
principle characterizes low-level perceptuo-motor con-
trol processes as well. On the other hand, however, it 
has frequently been argued that inhibitory control is a 
typical higher-level cognitive control function of central 
executive processes mediated by the prefrontal cortex 238
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(e.g., Band & van Boxtel, 1999; Faw, 2003). In line 
with this reasoning, evidence has been provided that 
inhibitory control is available only with supraliminally 
presented stimuli, but not with subliminally presented 
stimuli (e.g., Allport, Tipper, & Chmiel, 1985; Marcel, 
1980;  McCormick,  1997;  Merikle,  Joordens,  &  Stolz, 
1995; Neill, Valdes, & Terry, 1995; Tsushima, Sasaki, & 
Watanabe, 2006). In fact, the NCE obtained with sub-
liminal or near-threshold primes appears to be the only 
example where this general relationship does not hold, 
suggesting that this effect is either highly unusual, or 
simply not what it seems (i.e., not due to low-level in-
hibition).
However, we would like to argue that there is a third 
possibility.  Recently,  the  argument  has  gained  new 
momentum  that  the  dichotomy  between  ‘low-level’ 
‘automatic’ processes on the one hand and ‘high-level’ 
‘controlled’ processes on the other is misleading (see, 
e.g., Hommel, 2007). In fact, common sense suggests 
that processes that appear to be ‘high-level’ do in fact 
have to be instantiated by ‘low-level’ mechanisms if the 
homunculus fallacy is to be avoided. In this context it 
is important to reiterate that the self-inhibition account 
does  not  make  any  claims  about  the  role  of  partici-
pants’ conscious awareness of the prime. In fact, the 
perceptual learning study mentioned in the Discussion 
of Experiment 1 (Schlaghecken et al., in press) found 
that  although  training  drastically  improved  both  FC 
prime identification performance and subjective prime 
awareness, it had no effect on NCEs triggered by the 
masked primes. This strongly indicates that the physi-
cal characteristics of primes and masks, but not the 
presence  or  absence  of  conscious  prime  perception 
itself, determine the direction of priming effects. 
If  this  is  the  case,  however,  it  also  means  that 
performance in FC tasks can only be used to roughly 
estimate the influence of prime and mask on the mo-
tor system. Obviously, this comes dangerously close to 
the possibility of an ‘unfalsifiable’ argument (see also 
Lleras & Enns, 2006): When NCEs are obtained in a 
standard MP task, then it is assumed that the prime 
triggered a strong initial activation and that the mask 
was effective in rapidly removing the sensory evidence 
from the motor system. When no NCEs are obtained 
in this paradigm, then either the mask was ineffective, 
or the prime-induced activation was too weak to war-
rant self-inhibition. In other words, any outcome can 
be explained by making certain post-hoc assumptions 
about primes and masks. If FC prime identification or 
detection performance is not a suitable measure of the 
prime’s impact on the motor system – and we argue 
that it is not – then this problem can not be solved 
without  an  additional,  independent  measure  of  low-
level motor activity. Future studies will have to address 
this issue in order to clarify the nature of the NCE and 
to investigate the possibility of low-level inhibitory per-
ceptuo-motor control.
Notes
1  In  an  earlier  experiment,  one  of  the  prime/target 
stimuli  had  consisted  of  two  small  circles  (Eimer  & 
Schlaghecken, 1998, Exp. 2, Discussion). However, the 
alternative prime/target was a plus-sign, and no stimu-
lus-specific analyses were conducted. Thus one might 
still argue that  priming effects were only driven by the 
processing of straight-line configurations.
2 Previous research (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 1997) indi-
cated that using the same trial structure in the FC task 
as in the priming task (i.e., presenting a target after 
the mask) makes it virtually impossible for participants 
to respond to the prime. Similarly, not including longer 
prime durations, where participants feel that they have 
a chance to give a correct response, and having large 
numbers of trials, both tend to undermine participants’ 
motivation to stay on task. Therefore, these factors re-
sult in prime identification values that might systemati-
cally underestimate participants’ ability to consciously 
perceive the primes. The present FC design – like that 
used in other MP studies, e.g. Schlaghecken and Eimer 
(2006) – aimed to minimize the impact of these fac-
tors. 
3 ‘Perceptual strength’ is used here as meaning signal 
strength in the perceptual system. It is assumed that 
a perceptually strong prime will be more likely to be 
consciously  perceived  and  will  also  have  a  stronger 
impact  on  the  motor  system.  It  should  be  noted, 
however, that there is no a priori reason to assume 
that the former (conscious perception) is in any way 
causally linked to the latter (motor priming). In fact, 
there is evidence to suggest that these two are inde-
pendent of each other (Schlaghecken et al., in press). 
Therefore, prime identification performance in the FC 
task and motor priming effects in the masked prime 
task are likely to co-vary, but should not be regarded 
as being causally linked.
4  Note  that  the  marginally  significant  below-chance 
performance with 17-ms primes in group C (see also 
Verleger et al., 2005) was not replicated in group D. 
5 This is in contrast to the model proposed by Verleger, 
Kötter,  Jaśkowski,  Sprenger,  and  Siebner  (2006), 
where inhibition of the primed response is only indirect, 
resulting from the activation of the opposite response. 
6  This  hypothesis  is  based  on  the  assumption  that 
forced choice performance is affected (at least in part) NCE and self-inhibition
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by  the  same  basic  response  activation  mechanisms 
as performance in the masked prime task. If primes 
initially trigger their corresponding response, and self-
inhibition and disinhibition only develop subsequently, 
then  fast  responses  in  either  task  should  be  driven 
mainly by the former, and slow responses mainly by 
the latter. In the masked prime task, this should result 
in PCEs with faster and NCEs with slower responses, 
a result that has indeed been reported in the litera-
ture (Eimer, 1999). In the forced choice task, it should 
result in above-chance identification performance with 
faster and below-chance performance with slower re-
sponses. Although this has not yet been systematically 
investigated,  Verleger  et  al  (2005)  found  systematic 
below-chance  identification  performance  in  a  forced 
choice task where stimulus presentation rate was self-
paced and no time-limit was given for responding, sug-
gesting that a substantial proportion of responses were 
very slow. 
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